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Abstract: In this article, the God’s relationship to time is viewed from the 
perspective of modern physics. The purpose is to examine new 
perspectives by introducing a theory of time that has been unexplored in 
contemporary theology. The paper begins with an analysis of the two 
competing views of God’s relationship to time: timelessness and 
temporality. They are reviewed from the perspective of the special theory 
of relativity. In contemporary theology, God’s timelessness is usually 
combined with the block universe theory, which is based on the concept 
of unchanging spacetime. God’s temporality is usually associated with 
presentism, which denies the concept of spacetime. This division reflects 
a central conflict in physics: the mainstream interpretation of the special 
theory of relativity treats time as unchanging spacetime, while quantum 
physics treats time as dynamic and flowing. To resolve this conflict 
between the ontologies of the special theory of relativity and quantum 
physics, the implicate order theory is introduced. The implicate order 
theory was developed by David Bohm (1917–1992), one of the most 
visionary physicists of the 20th century. After introducing the theory, it is 
applied to the context of God’s relationship to time. This produces 
interesting new opportunities for theological research.    
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1. God and Time in Contemporary Research 
 
In this section of the paper, I first take a look at God’s timelessness and then at 
God’s temporality. I present a crucial counterargument to classical theism and, 
based on Einstein’s special theory of relativity, analyze an answer to the 
counterargument. Then, I take a look at God’s temporality from the perspective 
of the special theory of relativity. The goal of this first section is to outline the 
most crucial problems of the accounts of God’s timelessness and temporality as 
they are usually presented in contemporary research, which I then seek to resolve 





1.1. God’s Timelessness in Classical Theism 
 
God’s timelessness is closely tied to classical theism. From Antiquity to early 
modern times, classical theism was the dominant model of describing God’s 
attributes. Lists of God’s attributes usually contain the following: omnipotence, 
necessity, omniscience, perfect goodness, immutability, timelessness, simplicity, 
and impassibility.  
What separates classical theism from temporal accounts of God (for example, 
personal theism) are the last four: immutability, timelessness, simplicity, and 
impassibility. These attributes form a special kind of combination in which they 
are strongly connected to each other. The concept of God’s timelessness is 
strongly tied to His immutability: any succession in God’s existence would lead 
to the conclusion that he is mutable. God’s immutability (and thus timelessness) 
can also be derived from the concept of God’s metaphysical simplicity: as God’s 
simplicity is derived from Him being fully actualized potentiality, there can be 
no change in Him. There can be no unactualized potentiality in God, otherwise 
there would be potentiality for change and thus potentiality for succession 
(Mullins 2016, 47–63). 
The whole existence of a timeless God is present to Him all at once. God’s 
existence has no beginning, end, succession, temporal location, or temporal 
dimension. God’s whole life exists for Him all at once. The concept of a timeless 
present can be applied to describe God’s timelessness. The need to apply 
temporal terms to timeless concepts poses a challenge for the definition of 
timelessness (Mullins 2016, 47–49). 
Although God’s timelessness seems like a mystery, God’s relationship to the 
time of our physical universe can be described by a classical analogy: the 
relationship between the center and the circumference of a circle. The center 
represents God’s timeless now, whereas the circumference of the circle represents 
physical time. All moments of physical time exist equally from God’s perspective 
(DeFlorio and Frigerio 2019, 211–212). 
The most popular theory of time among the developers of classical theism is 
presentism.1 Although they are supporters of presentism, they also adopt the 
analogy of a circle and its circumference to describe God’s relationship to 
physical time, which means that they think that all moments of the temporal 
universe exist simultaneously for God. For medieval classical theism, a serious 
 
1 According to presentism, only the present moment exists. The past no longer exists, and the 
future does not yet exist. Augustine (354–430), Boethius (480–524/525), and Thomas Aquinas 
(1225–1274) are three of the four most important developers of classical theism. In contemporary 
research, Augustine and Boethius are usually identified as advocates of presentism. Although 
many contemporary theologians and philosophers also consider Aquinas to be a presentist, there 
are also those who view him as an eternalist; see for example Costa 2019. 




problem lies in the attempt to connect presentism and God’s timelessness. There 
is a logical contradiction in the claim that all moments of time are equally real 
from God’s timeless perspective, but only the present moment is real from the 
temporal perspective. The contradiction is due to the fact that any moment of 
time cannot exist from one perspective if it does not exist from the other. This 
critique was actually not invented by modern theologians. The Franciscan 
theologian Duns Scotus (1266–1308) presented it in the late medieval times 
(Padgett 1992, 52–53). 
This logical contradiction has been resolved in contemporary theology by 
applying a theory of time according to which all moments of time of the temporal 
physical universe are equally real; both from God’s timeless perspective and 
from the temporal perspective. Eternalism, according to which all moments of 
the temporal universe exist eternally, is usually presented to enable this solution. 
A specific form of eternalism is the block universe theory. According to the block 
universe theory, four–dimensional spacetime, in which time is the fourth 
dimension in addition to the three spatial dimensions, is completely changeless 
(Mullins 2016, 147).  
Next, I will examine the block universe theory to determine whether it can 
solve the aforementioned contradiction of classical theism. Advocates of the 
block universe theory often claim that it has an actual basis in physics, in the 
special theory of relativity. Thus, to examine the block universe theory, I take a 
closer look at its justifications by introducing some basic concepts of the special 
theory of relativity. 
 
1.2. Basic Concepts of the Special Theory of Relativity 
 
Einstein developed the special theory of relativity in 1905. According to the 
theory, objects do not travel merely through space but also through time. The 
speed of light (approximately 300 000 kilometers per second in a vacuum) is the 
maximum speed that anything can travel. The speed of light must always remain 
the same for all observers (or, more generally, in all reference frames). Whenever 
an observer measures the speed of light, the result of the measurement must 
always be the same regardless of the speed at which the observer moves. Every 
observer has its subjective reference frame from which it perceives space and 
time. Two observers moving relative to each other and viewing the same event 
observe different spatial and temporal coordinates (also known as spacetime 
coordinates) for the event. Only the measurements of spacetime intervals 
between two events remain the same from the perspective of all reference 
frames.2 Measuring spacetime intervals requires combining the movement of 
 
2 An event is defined as a point that has coordinates in three spatial dimensions and one 




objects through space and through time. This combined movement through 
space and time is what all observers can agree on. Retaining invariant spacetime 
intervals is usually referred to simply as retaining the invariant speed of light in 
all reference frames (Maudlin 1994, 34–57).  
The observer–dependence of temporal and spatial measurements appears for 
example in the form of time dilation.3 The movement of objects occurs through 
both space and time; the faster the object moves through space, the smaller 
proportion of its movement occurs through time. Thus, time passes slower in the 
reference frame of a fast–moving object. Time dilation is hardly observable in 
everyday life because the slowing down of time is noticeable only when the 
speed of the object approaches the speed of light. However, with accurate enough 
measurement devices, time dilation can be observed even for objects whose 
speed is nowhere close to the speed of light. If an object reaches the speed of light, 
it does not experience the passage of time at all. Reaching the speed of light is 
possible only for objects that have no mass, such as photons (Greene 1999, 56–
58). 
Since the speed of light is the maximum speed that any particle can travel, it 
is also the speed limit for causal effects. Thus, the speed of light limits the area of 
space that an observer can be causally connected within a certain timespan. This 
area is described by past and future light cones. If we choose the timespan t to be 
for example one year, then the past light cone contains all events from which light 
can reach the observer – and thus causally affect the observer – in one year. 
Similarly, a future light cone can be constructed for the observer, containing all 
events that the observer can possibly causally affect in the chosen duration t. The 
observer is time–like connected with the area inside the light cones. The area 
outside the light cones is the absolute elsewhere. Events outside the light cone of 
the observer are causally disconnected from the observer since a light signal 
cannot travel fast enough to connect them. Causal disconnectedness can be 
defined by treating the reference frame of the observer as an event that takes 
place as a single point of spacetime. If the timespan between two events (the 
spacetime points of the observer and of the observed event) is less than the 
 
called spacetime points or point events). A spacetime interval, the difference between two events, 
is s2 = (x2 – x1)2 + (y2 – y1)2 + (z2 – z1)2 – (t2 – t1)2 (derived from the Pythagorean theorem). A spacetime 
interval is more precisely expressed in the form ds2 = dx2 + dy2 + dz2 – dt2. When the spacetime 
coordinates of an event are transferred from one reference frame to another, the spacetime 
interval s2 remains invariant between the reference frames, and thus the spacetime interval is 
independent on the reference frame (Koperski 2015, 110). 
3 Other observer-dependent physical measurements are the length and the mass of an 
observed object. The observer-dependence of the length of an object is called length contraction. 
The faster an object moves relative to the observer, the shorter it appears. The observer-
dependence of the mass of an object is called mass variation. The faster on object moves relative 
to the observer, the larger its mass is (Koperski 2015, 120). 




distance between the events divided by the speed of light, they are causally 
disconnected (Greene 2004, 70–72). 
To define simultaneity between the observer and a causally disconnected 
event, a simultaneity relation between the reference frame of the observer and 
the area of spacetime belonging to the absolute elsewhere must be postulated. 
This simultaneity relation is described by the hypersurface of the present, also 
known as the simultaneity hyperplane. Different observers that move relative to 
each other disagree on the temporal order of the occurrence of events outside 
their light cones because the angle with which the hypersurface of the present 
cuts the spacetime depends on the relative speed of the observer. The greater the 
speed of the observer, the greater the angle in which it cuts spacetime. The 
difference between hypersurfaces of the present is usually negligible with 
relatively short distances, but with a great distance, even a small difference in 
relative speed causes the hypersurfaces between different observers to differ 
greatly (Greene 2004, 73). Picture 1 below depicts the effect of the speed of an 
observer on the hypersurface of the present. 
 
 
Picture 1: The light cone, the hypersurface of the present, and relative movement. 
For a moving observer, the light cone and the hypersurface is tilted.4  
 
Soon after Einstein had published his special theory of relativity, Einstein’s 
teacher, Hermann Minkowski (1864–1909), constructed his spacetime 
interpretation of the theory. Einstein immediately accepted the Minkowskian 
interpretation of the special theory of relativity. In contemporary physics, it has 
ever since remained the mainstream ontological interpretation of the theory. 
Minkowski reasoned that, because the simultaneity hyperplane of a moving 
 





observer cuts spacetime at an angle and because there are observers moving at 
different speeds, there must be as many different hypersurfaces of the present as 
there are observers. From the perspective of an observer who is moving towards 
another observer who is stationary in relation to the moving observer, some 
events that are not yet real for the stationary observer may belong to the 
hypersurface of the present or even to the past of the moving observer. Thus, 
what is past or present for one observer may be the future for another observer. 
It would be logically contradictory for the events that are real from the 
perspective of the moving observer to be unreal from the perspective of the 
stationary observer. An event cannot be real in one reference frame and unreal in 
another (Dainton 2010, 329). 
To avoid this contradiction, the same events must be real for both observers. 
Thus, the future of the stationary observer is already real even though those 
future events have not yet occurred from his perspective. It follows that past, 
present, and future moments of time must exist equally. Thus, the special theory 
of relativity implies the existence of the four–dimensional spacetime in which 
three spatial dimensions are merged with a time dimension. The four–
dimensional spacetime is also called Minkowski spacetime, which in the 
philosophy of time is often called the block universe theory (Dainton 2010, 330).  
 
1.3. Is the Future of the Block Universe Pre–Determined? 
 
In contemporary theology, advocates of classical theism often point out that the 
Minkowskian interpretation of the special theory of relativity resolves the 
aforementioned dilemma that emerged from the combination of presentism and 
classical theism: that all moments of time exist from God’s timeless perspective 
but that only the present moment exists from the temporal perspective. As the 
block universe theory implies that all moments of time from the beginning to the 
end of the universe exist equally, there is no problem with the assumption that 
all moments of time exist for God. 
However, the solution based on the block universe theory comes with a 
serious philosophical and theological cost. As there is only one possible future, 
the existence of alternative futures is impossible. Thus, free will seems 
impossible. Because free will is a basic requirement for the existence of moral 
responsibility, it must somehow be included in order to make the block universe 
model theologically feasible (Koperski 2015, 115–116). Proponents of God’s 
timelessness can defend the block universe theory by postulating that the one 
existing future follows causally from the temporal events of the universe, which 
contain acts of free will (Padgett 1992, 77).  
Thus far, however, advocates of the block universe have been unable to 
construct a theory of time that would enable the existence of alternative possible 




futures in the block universe.5 Such attempts seem futile since the topological 
structure of the block universe, by definition, contains only one possible future. 
If there cannot be any alternative possible futures, no acts of free will are possible. 
Thus, the block universe theory leads to the pre–determination of the future 
(Koperski 2015, 115).  
For the proponents of the block universe theory, a critical question remains 
unanswered: how can the existence of alternative possible futures be integrated 
into the concept of spacetime? It seems clear that, in order to enable the existence 
of alternative possible futures, the block universe theory has to be replaced with 
some other theory of time that allows the openness of the future. The 
paradigmatic solution in contemporary research on God’s relationship to time 
abandons both the block universe theory and classical theism and combines 
presentism with God's temporality. Next, I will examine this solution, especially 
from the perspective of the special theory of relativity. 
 
1.4. Abandoning God’s Timelessness 
 
In the early modern age, classical theism had to surrender its paradigmatic 
position to God’s temporality. Proponents of God’s temporality abandon the four 
key attributes of classical theism: immutability, simplicity, timelessness, and 
impassibility. Discarding timelessness means that God is temporal. A temporal 
God exists in the present moment and experiences the flow of time at the same 
rate as created beings. God is eternal (also called sempiternal), meaning that His 
life is without a beginning and an end (DeWeese 2002, 56).  
As the temporal universe is contingent but God’s existence necessary, God is 
not usually thought to exist essentially in the physical time of the universe 
(Leftow 1991, 34). Instead of existing essentially in physical time, God is thought 
to exist essentially in metaphysical time, which is a more fundamental order of 
time than the physical time of our universe.6 Metaphysical time flows at the same 
rate as physical time (Zimmerman 2001, 78).   
 
5 There are contemporary advocates of classical theism who assume that eternalism and 
human free will can be reconciled (see for example Helm 2010 and Rogers 2017). However, they 
do not explicate a topological structure of time that would enable the reconciliation of eternalism 
and human free will. It is clear that the block universe theory is not suitable for the purpose. In 
the last subsection of the paper, I formulate an eternalist account of branching time that 
incorporates human free will. 
6 The doctrine of Christianity assumes that our universe is created by God, and thus it has a 
beginning. Also, in physics, the paradigmatic explanation for our universe is the Big Bang theory, 
according to which our universe has a beginning. Thus, both Christian doctrine and natural 
sciences support the idea that our physical time has a beginning. As God is a necessary and 
everlasting being, He cannot exist essentially in physical time. Thus, God must exist essentially 




In contemporary theology, presentism is usually seen as the only theory of 
time that is compatible with God’s temporality.7 Presentism states that only the 
present moment is real and that past and future moments do not have real 
existence. Also, time has a real flow; the flow of time is not subjective or 
illusionary. The Minkowskian interpretation, which is the mainstream 
interpretation of the special theory of relativity, contradicts presentism by 
claiming that all moments of time exist equally, and the flow of time and the 
existence of the present moment are only subjective phenomena.  
The most popular way to explain presentism in the context of the special 
theory of relativity is to abandon the Minkowskian interpretation of the special 
theory of relativity and replace it with the neo–Lorentzian interpretation. 
According to the neo–Lorentzian interpretation of the special theory of relativity, 
time dilation can be explained by the slowing down of physical processes that 
follow from the increase of the length of the route that electromagnetic signals 
need to travel when an object moves faster. The neo–Lorentzian interpretation 
denies that the increase of the speed of an observer actually causes time to slow 
down for the observer. Time is not merged with space, and thus the concept of 
spacetime is also denied. The denial of spacetime also eliminates any reason to 
think that the flow of time is not real (Craig 2001, 184). 
Since the neo–Lorentzian interpretation of the special relativity is empirically 
indistinguishable from the Minkowskian interpretation, it is certainly allowed by 
physics. Thus, the neo–Lorentzian interpretation succeeds in defending 
presentism. However, the neo–Lorentzian interpretation comes with a cost as 
well. To defend presentism, one must make the assumption that contemporary 
physics is mistaken when assuming the reality of relativistic concepts, such as 
time dilation and the merging of space and time.  
For a closer integration of theology and physics, other options besides 
presentism should be examined. God’s temporality is not necessarily tied to 
presentism even though the two have been closely associated to one another in 
contemporary research of God’s relationship to time. In the next section of this 
article, I show that there is an alternative option available for the advocates of 
God’s temporality: the implicate order theory. With some modifications, the 
implicate order theory can also be applied by the advocates of God’s 
timelessness. 
 
7 There are also other accounts with real flow of time that can be combined with God’s 
temporality, such as the growing block theory. The growing block theory postulates that the past 
and present are real but the future is not yet real. However, as the contemporary research of God’s 
relationship to time is mostly focused on the juxtaposition of presentism and block universe, I 
treat presentism as the default account of God’s temporality. In this paper, I also show that the 
implicate order theory can be applied to reformulate God’s temporality. 
 




2. Quantum Physics and the Concept of Potentiality 
 
In this section, I examine a theory of physics that can combine the concepts of 
spacetime and the real flow of time: Bohm’s implicate order theory. The theory 
has been extensively discussed in the philosophy of physics, but the discussion 
has not yet been extended to the research of God’s relationship to time. After 
introducing the implicate order theory, I explore its theological possibilities. I 
attempt to apply the theory to resolve the problems outlined in the first section: 
the lack of alternative possible futures in the theory of God’s timelessness and 
the lack of spacetime in the theory of God’s temporality. 
 
2.1. Unifying the Real Flow of Time with Spacetime 
 
In the first section, the examination God’s relationship to time from the 
perspective of the special theory of relativity seemed to lead to the conclusion 
that the ontologies of presentism and the block universe theory contradict each 
other. The examination identified the central dilemma to be: how can the flow of 
time and the existence of alternative futures be integrated with the concept of 
spacetime?  
A key observation is that the contradiction between presentism and the block 
universe closely resembles the contradiction between the ontologies of two 
central theories of contemporary physics: the special theory of relativity and 
quantum physics. The ontology of the block universe theory is based on the 
Minkowskian interpretation of the special theory of relativity. All moments of 
time are equally real, and the flow of time is only an illusion. The ontology of 
quantum physics contradicts the Minkowskian interpretation of the special 
theory of relativity. Quantum physics implies that there is a real flow of time and 
a real division to the past, present, and future. Instead of things existing eternally 
in a static four–dimensional spacetime, they become real at the present moment 
(Stapp 1985, 264). 
To unify the ontologies of the special theory of relativity and quantum physics, 
one would have to abandon both the ontologies of presentism and the block 
universe theory and replace them with an alternative theory of time. In this 
unifying theory, relativistic concepts such as time dilation and spacetime are not 
abandoned like they are in the neo–Lorentzian interpretation. Also, the real flow 
of time and the existence of alternative possible futures are not abandoned like 
they are in the Minkowskian interpretation. Instead, the concept of spacetime is 







2.2. The Implicate Order Theory 
 
There is a theoretical framework in physics that is designed to reconcile the 
ontologies of the special theory of relativity and quantum physics: Bohm’s 
implicate order theory. The theory is based on the idea that the successful 
unification of the theories requires abandoning the mechanistic framework of the 
special theory of relativity.8 A holistic framework is required to successfully unite 
the special theory of relativity and quantum physics at the ontological level. 
According to the holistic framework, each part of the universe is connected to the 
wholeness of the universe on a deeper level (Bohm 1980, 138–149; 176). 
Bohm calls this deeper level the implicate order (derived from the word 
“implicit”), and from the implicate order arises our three–dimensional observed 
reality, which he calls the explicate order (derived from the word “explicit”). The 
implicate order contains all past and future moments, while the explicate order 
contains the present moment. Bohm also postulates that behind the implicate 
order, there is a multi–dimensional super–implicate order, which contains all 
possible timelines of the universe in a potential state, having a real but 
unactualized existence.9 Only one of the potential timelines becomes actualized 
through the flow of time. The actualized present moment is the explicate order, 
the three–dimensional present moment of the universe (Bohm and Hiley 1984, 
258).   
The implicate order theory resolves the aforementioned problem associated 
with the block universe: the pre–determination of the future, which follows from 
the existence of only one possible future. With the implicate order theory, the 
topology of the future of spacetime has the shape of a branching tree of potential 
 
8 According to Bohm’s definition, the mechanistic framework has three key characteristics. 
First, the whole material universe is reducible to elementary particles (or fields that give existence 
to the particles). Second, the universe is the sum of these particles (or fields) and nothing more. 
These particles are separate to and independent of each other and they are not connected to the 
wholeness on a deeper level. Third, the interaction between the particles is purely mechanical, 
and thus the only relationship between the particles is through external, causal influence. This 
external causality corresponds only to classical causality, whereas quantum physics allows 
nonlocal causality (Bohm 1986(i), 15). 
9 Bohm successfully constructed a mathematical formulation of the super-implicate order for 
boson fields (for example, the electromagnetic field). The particle-like properties that the 
electromagnetic field has in the form of photons emerge as a result of the action of the super-
implicate order, when energy is concentrated into a quantum packet from the area of the whole 
electromagnetic field. For the fermionic particles that constitute matter, Bohm did not succeed in 
creating a similar mathematical formulation (Pylkkänen 2007, 174-175). Other authors have 
attempted to complete the theory by expanding the mathematical formulations to fermionic 
particles. After Bohm’s passing, there have been many advances in formulating the theory. 
However, there is no consensus among physicists whether these attempts can be considered 
successful. For a notable attempt, see Nikolic 2005.  




futures instead of only one available future. Since future potentialities are 
available in the present moment, the future is not pre–determined.  
Another central difference compared to the block universe is that there is an 
objective present moment. The explicate order represents the present moment, 
which is objectively real. Thus, the flow of time is not only a subjective 
phenomenon (Bohm and Hiley 1984, 272). The justification for the existence of 
spacetime is no longer that all moments of time must exist equally, as the block 
universe theory entails. By combining the theory of special relativity with 
quantum physics, the implicate order theory gives the concept of spacetime a 
completely new ontological justification: the division between actual and 
potential. 
 
2.3. The Actualization of Potentialities from the Super–Implicate Order 
 
In his most advanced articulations of the implicate order theory, Bohm 
formulates the actualization of potentialities in the framework of the quantum 
field theory.10 The quantum field theory postulates that the existence of quantum 
fields is more fundamental than the existence of individual particles. Each type 
of particle (electrons, photons etc.) has its own corresponding quantum field that 
spreads through the whole universe (Bohm and Hiley 1993, 230–236). 
The quantum field theory treats particles as a series of repeated energy spikes 
of the corresponding quantum field. A particle seems like a stable entity, but is 
actually constantly re–created by extremely rapid concentrations of energy from 
the quantum field. Without this constant re–creation that is guided by the 
implicate order and the super–implicate order, all physical objects would 
instantly cease to exist (Cobb 1985, 158). This constant re–creation of particles is 
the process of actualization.  
 
10 The quantum field theory is the most accurate quantum theory of contemporary physics (or, 
more accurately, one should speak of quantum field theories as there are many versions of the 
theory). The central motivator for the quantum field theory is that the Schrödinger wave function, 
which describes the dynamic evolution of a quantum system, is not Lorentz invariant. To 
maintain Lorentz invariance, the spacetime coordinates of an event must be transformable from 
one inertial reference frame (a reference frame moving at a constant speed) to another. This 
transformation of spacetime coordinates between inertial reference frames is called Lorentz 
transformation, and transformability of the coordinates is called Lorentz invariance. Due to the 
low speed of most particles when compared to the speed of light, the non-Lorentz-invariance of 
traditional quantum physics does not usually cause serious inaccuracies to predictions of the 
evolution of quantum systems. However, because nowadays quantum physics examines high-
speed particles, especially particles accelerated in large hadron colliders, relativistic treatment is 
necessary for gaining accurate results. Also, the treatment of electromagnetic fields (in which 
light particles, photons, are manifest) is incompatible with non-relativistic quantum physics and 




A more familiar example of actualization is the collapse of the wave function. 
According to the usual interpretation (the Copenhagen interpretation) of 
quantum physics, the collapse of the wave function represents the process of 
actualization. Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976), one of the early central 
developers of quantum physics, suggests that the existence of potentialities in a 
single–particle system is described by the Schrödinger wave function. Before the 
collapse of the wave function, a quantum system possesses all its quantum states 
simultaneously. This simultaneous existence of all states of the quantum system 
reflects the existence of potentialities. When the quantum system takes a definite 
value in the collapse of the wave function (which is caused by a measurement or 
by an observation of the system), a potentiality becomes actualized (Heisenberg 
1958, 53).  
Bohm agrees that the wave function contains the potentialities. However, 
there are three ways in which Bohm advances Heisenberg’s view of the concept 
of potentiality. First, there is no such thing as the collapse of the wave function. 
Particles have real existence even when they are not measured or observed. 
Second, Bohm postulates that, instead of separable single–particle systems, there 
is only one, universal quantum system: the implicate order, which contains 
potentialities for the next present moment. Single–particle quantum systems are 
only approximations: any quantum subsystem of the implicate order is 
inseparable from the whole as the whole surrounding universe affects every 
subsystem.11 Third, all potentialities exist eternally in the super–implicate order, 
which directs the quantum fields through the implicate order. The super–
implicate order contains all potential states of the universe from its beginning to 
its end, whereas the implicate order contains all potentialities for the next present 
moment. The implicate order mediates information from the super–implicate 
order to the quantum fields, directing the energy spikes of the quantum fields, 
which manifest as stable particle–like entities in the explicate order (Bohm 
1986(ii), 154–155).  
What is the ontological status of the potentialities? The super–implicate order 
contains all the potential ways in which the future can unfold. The potentialities 
are ontologically real, existing in the multi–dimensional structure of the super–
implicate order. However, the potentialities have a clear ontological difference 
compared to actualized events. Actualized events consist of energy spikes of the 
 
11 In contemporary physics, a more familiar name for the implicate order is “the wave function 
of the universe”. Because the form of the quantum field is affected by every particle in the 
universe, the wave functions of subsystems inspected in empirical quantum physics are 
approximations. The wave function of the universe is a complex system that consists of a vast 
amount of quantum subsystems, each of which is affected by its surroundings (Durr et al. 1992, 
858–866). 




quantum fields, whereas potential events consist of all the possible states of the 
quantum fields.12 
 
2.4. The Implicate Order Theory Combines Growing Block and Branching 
Spacetime  
 
To complete the examination of the implicate order theory, there is one more 
aspect to consider: the part of the implicate order that contains the actualized 
past. Bohm explains that past events are in an enfolded state contrary to present 
events, which are unfolded in the explicate order. All past moments of time have 
a real but enfolded existence in the implicate order of the past (Bohm 1980, 205). 
Their ontological status differs from the events that are currently being actualized 
in the explicate order. This way, their status is different than in the block 
universe, which simply treats all moments of time as ontologically equal. 
A central factor of the actualized past is its role in coordinating the 
actualization of the potentialities. The actualized past, which is enfolded back 
into the implicate order, determines which potentialities of the super–implicate 
order are available. Only those potentialities that are causally available from the 
perspective of the actualized past are available for actualization (Bohm 1985(i), 
173).13 The whole process of actualization is summarized in picture 2 below. 
 
 
12 The organization of potential states of the universe into a higher-dimensional structure is 
comparable to the functionality of a computer, which can store information and retrieve it from 
tables with coordinate numbers. Similarly, the information of the potential states of the physical 
universe could be stored into a multi-dimensional structure (Pylkkänen 2007, 171). 
13 Bohm’s best-known theory, the pilot wave theory, postulates that quantum physics is 
deterministic. Any quantum-level indeterminism actually follows from hidden variables: 
unobservable variables that make quantum systems behave in seemingly random ways. Bohm’s 
latest formulations of the implicate order theory unify the pilot wave theory with the quantum 
field theory. However, the implicate order theory is not completely deterministic. Bohm 
postulates that acts of human free will are not causally determined by the past states of the 
universe. In his attempt to explain how free will can be maintained in the framework of the 
implicate order, Bohm uses an analogy of the interaction between a player, a computer, and a 
display. According to the analogy, the explicate order is comparable to the events that occur on a 
display, the implicate order is comparable to the display, and the super-implicate order is 
comparable to the computer that arranges the things that are shown on the display. The “player”, 
whose consciousness is tied to the interaction, sees the events of the explicate order occurring on 
the display and is immersed as a part of them. Without the role of consciousness, the implicate 
order and the super-implicate order would only execute a pre-determined program (Bohm and 





Picture 2: The process of the actualization of potentialities according to the 
implicate order theory.  
 
Bohm mentions that the coordination between the past implicate order and 
the super–implicate order is crucial for maintaining the stability of particles. 
Without these higher–dimensional connections, energy spikes would appear 
randomly in the area of the quantum field, and the energy spikes would not 
generate patterns that form stable particles. This explanation gives the implicate 
order theory a significant advantage over other quantum field theories in 
ontological explaining power. Other quantum field theories cannot explain why 
the series energy spikes of the quantum fields are able to generate stable particles 
(Bohm 1985(i), 173). 
Bohm never formulated the implicate order theory specifically in the form of 
a branching spacetime theory. He was more interested in presenting the physics 
of the theory than formulating it in the context of the philosophy of time. 
However, it is obvious that the version of the implicate order theory that contains 
the concept of the super–implicate order shares defining properties with 
branching spacetime theories. Although the super–implicate order is eternally 
unchanging from the eternal perspective, the branches that cannot causally 
follow from actualized history can be treated as “fallen off” when viewed from 
the temporal perspective. The past spacetime of the implicate order is similar to 
the growing block universe. In this way, the implicate order theory is a hybrid of 




two theories of time: growing block universe (past) and branching spacetime 
(future). The structure of branching spacetime (and its comparison to presentism 
and the block universe) can be seen in picture 3 below.14 
 
 
Picture 3: The structure of time according to presentism, block universe and 
branching spacetime theories. There is no objective present moment in the block 
universe. 
 
In the next subsection, I examine the implications of the implicate order 
theory for God’s relationship to time, and I present two alternative 
interpretations. The first interpretation postulates that the network of 
potentialities exists eternally and that there is an objective flow of time that God 
experiences at the same rate as created being do. The second interpretation 
postulates that, from God’s eternal perspective, spacetime appears to Him as 
completely actualized. The flow of time is experienced by temporal observers 
who participate in the passage of time of the temporal universe from their own 
reference frames. 
 
2.5. The First Interpretation: God’s Temporality 
 
In the first interpretation of the implicate order theory, I take Bohm’s theoretical 
framework in its original form and apply it to God’s relationship to time. From 
 
14 Branching spacetime theories have been discussed for example in Belnap 1992 and McCall 
1994. For a discussion of branching spacetime in theological the context of theology, see for 




the perspective of a temporal observer, the structure of time is a combination of 
growing block and branching spacetime. In the present moment, a future from 
among all the potential futures becomes actualized with the flow of physical 
time. As Bohm postulates that spacetime has an objective present moment, it is 
natural to assume that this objective present moment is God’s perspective on 
physical time. 
God created the potentialities at the moment of creation. From the eternal 
perspective, the super–implicate order remains unchanging. God’s perspective 
on the unchanging super–implicate order represents His eternal perspective on 
time. The eternal perspective differs from the timeless perspective of the God of 
classical theism, which entails God’s immutability. The postulation that 
potentialities exist eternally for God does not imply that He is immutable. 
Instead, since God participates in the flow of physical time, He cannot be 
immutable. An interpretation of the theory that enables God’s immutability is 
presented in the next subsection. 
This first interpretation might appeal to advocates of God’s temporality. The 
structure of time shares similarities with presentism: there is an objective present 
moment and an objective division to the past, present, and future. However, 
adopting the implicate order theory instead of presentism offers several 
theological advantages: 
 
1. It offers a theory of time that accepts the concept of spacetime, which is 
central in physics, and updates the concept to incorporate the quantum 
field theory, which is the most advanced quantum theory. 
2. Treating particles as energy spikes of the quantum fields instead of 
permanent objects allows new opportunities for defining the concept of 
continuous creation. Without the constant actualization of potentialities 
from the super–implicate order, all physical objects would cease to exist 
instantly. 
3. It helps explain how God knows future potentialities and thus can help 
define God’s foreknowledge of the future. The knowledge of 
potentialities points towards Molinism as the account of God’s 
foreknowledge. 
4. The ability to see potentialities allows God to pre–arrange temporal 
events as He wills, especially if combined with the idea that God has the 
power to decide which potentialities become actualized whenever He 
wills to do so. This offers new opportunities for defining the concepts of 
creatio ex nihilo and divine providence.   
 
Since Molinism has been questioned in contemporary theology, the validity of 
the last two advantages is debatable. Molinism postulates that before the moment 




of creation, God had a type of foreknowledge called middle knowledge, which 
included all the possible states of the universe and all choices of human free will 
in each of the possible states. Molinism also attempts to explain divine 
providence by postulating that, with the knowledge of future potentialities and 
the choices of human free will, God can actualize a universe that best suits His 
needs (DeFlorio and Frigerio 2019, 158–161). 
However, there is a considerable drawback to Molinism. The principle of 
grounding states that God cannot foreknow the acts of human free will unless 
His knowledge is grounded in actual choices made by humans. The advocates of 
the principle of grounding claim that it is difficult to conceive what other 
grounding there could be than the actual choices of free will (DeFlorio and 
Frigerio 2019, 176–180). The implicate order theory lacks the grounding of God’s 
knowledge of choices of human free will. The choices of free will are actualized 
in the present moment, and thus they do not exist before the actualization of 
potentialities. Thus, if the principle of grounding is adopted, the implicate order 
theory does not help explain how God can know the choices of human free will. 
God’s knowledge of the super–implicate order only satisfies the requirement of 
His knowledge of all the possible states of the universe but does not imply that 
He knows the actual choices of free will. 
In the framework of this first interpretation, the requirement of grounding of 
the knowledge of acts of human free will implies a diminishing of God’s 
providential power. If God has no knowledge of actual choices of humans, He 
cannot have complete power to pre–organize future events as He wills. Such 
capacity would require taking into account choices of free will. However, it is 
debatable whether God needs to have such providential power and 
foreknowledge. One could as well assume open theism, according to which God 
has no definite knowledge and no perfect control of the future.  
Alternatively, one can dispute the claim that God’s knowledge of acts of 
human free will requires grounding in the real existence of future events. If the 
principle of grounding is rejected, this first interpretation of God’s relationship 
to time in the framework of the implicate order theory seems satisfactory. 
However, in the case that the principle of grounding is adopted, an alternative 
explanation of God’s foreknowledge and providential power is required. 
To enable the principle of grounding, one might add the assumption that from 
God’s eternal perspective, spacetime exists eternally as actualized from 
beginning to end. However, this would not enable Molinism, which entails that 
God knows all the choices of free will in all possible timelines of the universe. To 
explain middle knowledge, it is not enough that God knows which one of all the 
potential timelines will be actualized. God’s knowledge of acts of human free will 
must be explained also in all the potential timelines that will never be actualized 




actualized universe exists for God from beginning to end allows the timeless 
solution for explaining God’s foreknowledge. This alternative is presented in the 
next subsection 
 
2.6. The Second Interpretation: The Two–Dimensional Theory of Time 
 
The second interpretation applies the implicate order theory to God’s 
relationship to time by postulating that physical time has two dimensions: 
temporal and eternal. I choose to call this version of the theory the two–
dimensional theory of time. This interpretation is inspired by Bohm’s theory, but 
it adds an additional layer to it: God’s eternal perspective on spacetime that is 
completely actualized from the beginning of time to the end of time. Bohm had 
no reason to postulate the existence of a completely actualized spacetime as he 
did not take into account God’s eternal perspective on time. This eternal 
perspective on time resembles God’s timelessness in classical theism, and thus it 
might be embraced especially by advocates of God’s timelessness.15 The division 
of time into temporal and eternal dimensions adds a key component that is 
missing in the block universe version of classical theism: the incorporation of free 
will into the concept of spacetime. 
Theories of two–dimensional time have been presented before, although not 
in the form of a theory of branching time. Two well–known theories share 
similarities with my theory. The first is Anselm of Canterbury’s (1033–1109) 
version of classical theism.16 The second is German theologian Karl Heim’s (1874–
1958) theory of two–dimensional time.17 With my version of the two–dimensional 
theory of time, I add to these theories what they lack: by using Bohm’s theoretical 
 
15 I choose to call God’s perspective of actualized spacetime eternal instead of timeless in order 
to underline the idea that the theory of two-dimensional time does not necessarily have to be 
combined with classical theism. It could as well be combined with God’s temporality. One could 
discard God’s immutability, at least in the form that it appears in classical theism, and still retain 
the idea that the whole actualized spacetime exists for God.  
16 Anselm is one of the four most important developers of classical theism. He thinks of God’s 
timelessness as a higher dimension, in which our temporal universe is located. Thus, each 
temporal moment is actually present to God simultaneously, which explains God’s 
foreknowledge of the future. Even though most contemporary researchers of God’s relationship 
to time think that Anselm supports the block universe theory, Leftow notes that Anselm also 
assumes that the flow of time is real. It seems that, according to Anselm, the universe is static 
from God’s timeless perspective but that the flow of time is real from the temporal perspective. 
However, Anselm does not explain how these two seemingly contradicting positions can both be 
true. He only refers to God’s transcendence as an explanation (Leftow 1991, 183–199). 
17 The German theologian Karl Heim (1874–1958) was a close friend of Einstein. Based on the 
relativity theory, Heim postulated that the physical time of our universe has two dimensions: the 
temporal dimension of created beings and the eternal dimension of God, for whom the whole 
spacetime exists as an entity. For a summary of Karl Heim’s thinking, see Eerikäinen 2000. 




framework, I explicate the relationship between temporal and eternal 
perspectives of time.  
Branching time enables the timeless solution to resolve the contradiction of 
God’s foreknowledge and human free will. The timeless solution is based on the 
idea that, as God’s foreknowledge of the future is timeless, it does not temporally 
precede the acts of human free will. Thus, human free of will is not overruled by 
God’s infallible knowledge of the future. Also, to maintain human free will, 
God’s knowledge of the future must causally depend on the temporal process. 
This is called the principle of dependence. Due to the branching structure of time, 
human free will is maintained because future possibilities are available at each 
temporal moment (DeFlorio and Frigerio 2019, 240–250). 
As spacetime has a fully actualized existence for God, the grounding principle 
of God’s foreknowledge of the future is satisfied: God knows the future because 
all moments of time have an actualized existence for Him. However, for a 
temporal observer, there is a division into unactualized and actualized events 
and thus a division into the past, present, and future. The branching structure of 
spacetime allows the pre–existence of the future to be combined with human free 
will since the topological structure of spacetime is such that all possible futures 
are available from the perspective of a temporal reference frame. Thus, the two–
dimensional time interpretation of the implicate order theory seems to be able to 
explain how the topological structure of spacetime allows the combination of the 
pre–existence of the future with human free will. 
As was stated in the first section of this paper, the presentist version of classical 
theism attempted to combine the real flow of time with God’s timelessness. 
However, it suffered from the logical contradiction of future events being unreal 
from the temporal perspective and real from the timeless perspective. The theory 
of two–dimensional time resolves the contradiction with the division of events 
into the categories of actual and potential, which both belong to the category of 
existing events. In this way, an event can already be actualized from God’s 
eternal perspective and still unactualized from the perspective of a temporal 
reference frame without causing a logical contradiction. From the temporal 
perspective, future events exist but are yet unactualized. The contradiction of the 
presentist version of classical theism is avoided. 
From the perspective of the temporal observer, it seems that time flows 
dynamically, but time is actually tenseless (B–theoretical) in its objective form: 
any division into the past, present, and future is subjective. The temporal process 
does not generate new events. Instead, eternally existing events are introduced 
to a temporal observer. This process creates the subjective experience of the flow 
of time (Leininger 2020, 13–14). In the two–dimensional theory of time, the 
process of actualization is the introduction of eternally existing events to the 




like a block universe. However, the static spacetime is only half of the picture. As 
the principle of dependence states, future events that exist eternally for God are 
caused by the temporal process. The temporal process is real as well – but 
subjective, as it is tied to temporal reference frames.  
An obvious objection to this theory is that the future cannot be both caused by 
the temporal process and pre–exist eternally “before” the actualization that 
occurs through the temporal process. The eternal and temporal perspectives 
seem to contradict each other, but the implicate order theory can coherently fit 
them together. From the perspective of the present moment of a temporal 
observer, all future branches of each next present moment are ontologically 
equally real in the implicate order. The implicate order is a universal wave 
function that contains all potential ways that the next present moment can be 
actualized.18 Through the process of actualization, only one of these potential 
branches becomes actual (see the picture 4 below). 
 
18 The idea of the equal existence of each future branch is based on the quantum field theory. 
In his article concerning pre-space, Bohm interprets the implicate order as a vacuum state of 
empty space. Bohm’s theory, like all versions of the quantum field theory, recognizes that the 
empty vacuum of space is not really empty but contains a huge amount of energy. All potential 
states of the next present moment of the universe exist simultaneously in the quantum fields. The 
simultaneous existence of all states is the zero-point energy of the quantum fields. The term zero-
point energy reflects the fact that physics can only observe energy states above the zero-point 
energy level of the quantum fields, in other words, energies that represent the actualized states 
of the fields. Thus, actualized particles are only a ripple on the surface of this vast sea of energy 
that is the vacuum state (Bohm 1985(ii), 196–197). The state of zero-point energy of the quantum 
fields is not only a mathematical formulation but can actually be experimentally verified by 
placing two plates extremely close together in a vacuum. Since only vacuum fluctuations with 
short wavelengths fit between the plates, the vacuum energy between the plates is diminished, 
and the pressure between the plates is less than the pressure outside the plates. The energy of the 
vacuum outside the plates exerts pressure on the plates, pushing them together. This pressure is 
called the Casimir effect (Lamoreux 1997).   





Picture 4: There are ontologically three types of branches: 1) Actualized branches 
(the red line), 2) Potential branches in the implicate order (the wider blue line), and 
3) Potential branches in the super–implicate order (the narrow blue line). At each 
present moment, the potential branches depicted by the wider blue line are 
ontologically real. 
 
From the perspective of the present moment of a temporal reference frame, the 
branch that is already chosen to be actualized from God’s eternal perspective is 
ontologically indistinguishable from the branches that do not belong to the 
eternally existing actualized spacetime. However, as the future already exists for 
God, it is pre–determined. This makes human free will compatibilist instead of 
libertarian. According to compatibilism, the pre–determination of the future and 
the freedom of will are compatible. As the pre–determination of the future is 
caused by the temporal process of the actualization of potentialities, which 
includes the acts of human free will, compatibilism is sufficient to maintain real 
freedom of will and thus to allow real moral responsibility. 
As a conclusion, it can be stated that the theory of two–dimensional time has 
all the same advantages as the first interpretation (see the list in the previous 
subsection that discusses the first interpretation of the theory). Additionally, the 
theory of two–dimensional time has at least two additional advantages that can 
be added to the list. First, the actualization of spacetime can help explain how 
God has foreknowledge of all future events: His knowledge is grounded in the 
actualization of the events. Second, God’s knowledge of how events are 
actualized helps to explain His providential power. From God’s eternal 
perspective, causal relations appear as relations that have already occurred. In 
the act of creatio ex nihilo, the perspective on actualized spacetime allows God to 




The network of causalities appears to God like a multi–dimensional puzzle. The 
ability to see all potentialities in the super–implicate order and the results of the 
temporal process of actualization give God the power to arrange events as He 
likes, especially if it is postulated that He has the top–down causal power to 
decide which potentialities become actualized whenever He wills to do so. 
Also, the two–dimensional version of the theory makes the implicate order 
theory compatible with classical theism as spacetime is static from God’s eternal 
perspective (or, according to classical theism, His timeless perspective). 
However, the theory is not limited to classical theism. One could as well postulate 
that God is temporal but that spacetime has a completely actualized existence for 
Him. God can live in His own metaphysical time, which does not need to be 
synchronized with the time of the physical universe. This way, the postulation 
that is common in contemporary theology, according to which God’s 
metaphysical time must flow at the same rate as the time of the physical universe, 
is not absolutely necessary. Also, as God’s foreknowledge of the future is based 
on the actualized future, the grounding principle becomes available to advocates 




In contemporary research, discussion about God’s relationship to time has 
concentrated on a dichotomy between God’s timelessness combined with the 
block universe theory and God’s temporality combined with presentism. Neither 
of the accounts seems completely satisfactory. The account of God’s timelessness 
suffers from the problem of incorporating free will into the block universe, and 
God’s temporality combined with presentism suffers from the denial of 
spacetime. 
It seems that to improve the overall coherence of God’s relationship to time, 
and its coherence with contemporary physics, one must seek a solution outside 
the traditional pairs of timelessness / block universe and temporality / 
presentism. The juxtaposition between the block universe and presentism 
resembles the ontological contradiction between the special theory of relativity 
and quantum physics. To unite the perspectives, I have applied Bohm’s implicate 
order theory since it is able to unite the ontologies of the special theory of 
relativity and of quantum physics. Applying the implicate order theory to God’s 
relationship to time gives two alternative interpretations. 
The first interpretation applies the implicate order theory directly, postulating 
that God experiences the flow of time at the same rate as humans. This makes the 
temporal account of God more justified from the perspective of physics by 
accepting the concept of spacetime instead of denying it. By applying the concept 
of actualization of potentialities, the implicate order theory modifies the concept 




of spacetime in a way that enables incorporating the real flow of time into it. The 
implicate order theory also adds the quantum field theory to the picture, giving 
the theory an even more rigid basis on physics.  
The second interpretation adds a layer to the implicate order theory, 
postulating that God has an eternal perspective on time. This can resolve a major 
problem of God’s timelessness: God’s immutability has thus far been usually 
combined with the block universe, which has only one possible future, and thus 
it excludes the freedom of will. However, with two–dimensional time, spacetime 
is branching when viewed from the temporal perspective, and all possible 
alternative futures are in a potential state. Only from God’s eternal perspective is 
spacetime fully actualized. This version of the theory might raise the objection 
that as the future already exists from God’s perspective, it must be pre–
determined. This objection is answered by the notion that fully actualized 
spacetime follows causally from the temporal process of actualization. 
The first interpretation is much simpler and also has a more rigid basis in 
physics as it follows the implicate order theory more closely. However, the 
implicate order theory does not take into account any theological perspective. 
Thus, it naturally excludes the possibility that God’s perspective on time can be 
completely different from the temporal perspective. The assumption that, from 
God’s eternal perspective, spacetime exists as completely actualized is not 
incompatible with the implicate order theory. It simply adds another layer to the 
theory. Added complexity is a price to pay for the theory of two–dimensional 
time.  
Whether the theory of two–dimensional time has enough advantages over the 
simpler version that would justify its added complexity is a matter of further 
analysis. Regardless of which of the two alternative theories presented here is 
more justified, in the light of the argumentation presented in this paper, I find 
the implicate order theory to offer interesting opportunities for theology. 
Applying it to God’s relationship to time can help define central theological 
concepts, such as the concepts of creation, divine providence, and God’s 
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